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Abstract
Over the past decade or so, the electricity industry of the Republic of Turkey
(and  indeed  the  world) has  undergone  profound  reform  in  its  structure, 
ownership  and  mindset.  Increasing  public  concern  about  efficiency  in  the 
sector  has led  Turkey to  discard  the  traditional  model  of  a  vertically 
integrated industry subject to cost-based regulation in favor of the unbundling 
of  activities  and  the  introduction  of  competition  where  it  is  possible.  The 
industry  has  been  structurally  separated  into  generation,  transmission, 
distribution and retail segments. The competitive segments of the industry 
(generation and retail) are planed to progressively expose to competition; the 
monopoly segments (especially, distribution) are to be reoriented to foster 
competition.  Further,  the  ownership  of  the  industry  is  under  increasing 
pressure  to move  away from  the  public domain  into the  private  one.  The 
present article not only presents an analysis of the Turkish distribution sector 
and  proposed  privatization  process  but  also  provides  some  guidelines  for 
policy makers.
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1. Introduction
Turkey’s electricity distribution utility, TEDAS, and its distribution companies 
are  Turkish  state-owned  joint-stock  companies engaged  in  the  distribution 
and retail sale of electricity and provision of retail services to final customers. 
With approximately 28 million customers, 93 billion kWh of electricity sales 
and  98%  market  share  in  electricity  distribution  across  Turkey  in  2005, 
TEDAS  and  its  distribution  companies  together  form  one  of  the  largest 
organizations in the country (Lazard, 2007). 
In  the article,  the  evolution  of  Turkish  electricity  distribution  industry  is 
analyzed and then the decision about the privatization of Turkish electricity 
distribution  regions  is  considered.  The  article  is  divided  into  four  main 
sections.  In  Section  2  the  reader  is  briefly  familiarized  with  the  Turkish 
economy  and  energy  situation.  Section  3 provides  an  impression  of  the 
Turkish electricity distribution business; including its evolution, recent market 
reforms,  legal  environment  and  ongoing  privatization  process.  Section  4
elaborates on the question of “why should the distribution be privatized?”. In 
Section 5, current policies are evaluated and some guidelines are introduced 
for policy makers to prevent some irreversible mistakes in market structure 
policy.  Finally,  a  summary  and  some  concluding  remarks  are  provided  in 
Section 6.3
2. A summary of Turkish economy and energy situation
The Republic of Turkey, located in Southeastern Europe and Southwestern 
Asia (that portion of Turkey west of the Bosporus is geographically part of 
Europe), has an area of about 780,580 sq km and a population of over 70 
million (CIA, 2007). With its young population, growing energy demand per 
person, fast  growing  urbanization and economic development, Turkey has 
been one of the fast growing power markets of the world for the last two 
decades. Turkey is an energy importing country; more than half of the energy 
requirement has been supplied by imports.
Turkey's  dynamic  economy  is  a  complex  mix  of  modern  industry  and 
commerce  along  with a  traditional  agriculture sector  that  still accounts  for 
more than 35% of employment. It has a strong and rapidly growing private 
sector,  yet  the  state  still  plays  a  major  role  in  basic  industry,  banking, 
transport, and communication. Real GNP growth has exceeded 6% in many 
years, but this strong expansion has been interrupted by sharp declines in 
output  in  1994,  1999  and  2001  due  to  economic  crisis.  The  economy  is 
turning around with the implementation of economic reforms and 2004 GDP 
growth reached 9%, followed by roughly 5% annual growth from 2005-06. 
Inflation fell to 7.7% in 2005, a 30-year low, but  climbed back to 9.8% in 
2006. Despite the strong economic gains from 2002-06, which were largely 
due  to  renewed  investor  interest  in  emerging  markets,  IMF  backing,  and 
tighter fiscal policy, the economy is still burdened by a high current account 
deficit and high debt. Prior to 2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey 
averaged  less  than  $1  billion  annually,  but  further  economic  and  judicial 4
reforms  and  prospective  EU  membership
1 are  expected  to  boost  FDI. 
Privatization sales are currently approaching $21 billion (CIA, 2007).
Turkey's population of more than 70 million is growing at an annual rate of 
1.04%  and  expected to  grow  to  83.4  million  in  2022. In  response  to  the 
growth  rates  of  population  and  consumption,  Turkey's  total  final  energy 
consumption (TFC) grew at an average annual rate of 9.6% over the last 
three  decades.  This  average  annual  growth  rate  of  TFC  is  projected  to 
decrease to 5.4% between 2005 and 2010 and 7% between 2010 and 2020 
(Evrendilek  et  al.,  2003). Table  1 presents  some  important  selected 
Indicators for Turkey as of 2004 (CIA, 2007).
[ Table 1 goes here ]
Turkey's  primary  energy  sources  include  hydropower,  geothermal,  lignite, 
hard coal, oil, natural gas, wood, animal and plant wastes, solar and wind 
energy. In 2004, primary energy production and consumption has reached 
24.1 million tonnes (Mt) of oil equivalent (Mtoe) and 81.9 Mtoe, respectively. 
Table  2 shows  the  Turkey's  energy  balance  table  in  2004.  Fossil  fuels 
provided about 86.9% of the total energy consumption of the year 2004, with 
oil (31.5%) in first place, followed by coal (27.3%) and natural gas (22.8%). 
Turkey has not utilized nuclear energy yet
2. The Turkish coal sector, which 
includes  hard  coal  as  well  as  lignite,  accounts  for  nearly  one  half  of  the 
country's  total  primary  energy  production  (%43.7).  The  renewables 
collectively  provided  13.2%  of  the  primary  energy,  mostly  in  the  form of 5
combustible renewables and wastes (6.8%), hydropower (about 4.8%) and 
other renewable energy resources (approximately 1.6%) (IEA, 2007)
[ Table 2 goes here ]
As can be seen in Table 2, the general equilibrium of energy use and supply 
indicators show that Turkey is dependent on import resources very heavily. In 
2004, 77.6% of the total energy supply was met by imports, and the rest was 
domestically produced.
Turkey’s total electricity production and installed capacity were 162.5 GWh
3
and 38.8 MW, respectively, in 2005 (Erdogdu, 2007a). The distribution of the 
produced  electricity  energy  according  to  primary  energy  sources  was  as 
follows: natural gas 44.74%, hydropower 25.11%, coal 25.05%, oil 4.92%, 
biomass  0.09%,  geothermal  0.06%  and  wind  0.04%  (Kone et  al.,  2007). 
Table 3 reflects the increasing reliance on natural gas
4 in the power sector. 
The share of natural gas power plants in installed capacity was about 37% in 
2005. Likewise, natural gas had the largest share in gross electricity output in 
2005.
[ Table 3 goes here ]
Recently,  Turkey  has  initiated  a  major  reform  program  of  the  regulatory 
framework surrounding the most important segments of her energy market; 
namely,  electricity,  natural  gas,  petroleum  and  liquefied  petroleum  gas 
industries. The reform program entails privatization, liberalization as well as a 6
radical  restructuring  of  the  whole  energy  industry.  Also,  an  autonomous 
regulatory body, Energy Market Regulatory Authority
5 (EMRA), was created 
to  set  up  and  maintain  a  financially  strong, stable,  transparent  and 
competitive energy market.
The Turkish electricity industry is a large, high-growth sector in the Turkish 
economy. The industry contributes significantly to the country’s GDP and is a 
USD 12 billion industry at current end-user prices. The sector’s share in the 
Turkish economy has been growing rapidly, given the 8% per annum growth 
in electricity demand over the past two decades. This rate of demand growth 
has been higher than the growth rates seen in other major Turkish industries
and outstrips growth in the Turkish economy overall.
Distribution  losses  of  the  system,  which  amounted  to  19.8  billion  kWh  in 
2004, are high compared to international benchmarks. Accordingly, one of 
the primary objectives of the electricity sector reform has been defined as 
reducing the loss/theft ratio to OECD levels.
Despite  increasing demand, Turkey’s per capita  gross consumption is still 
very low at 2,090 kWh compared to the EU average of 6,460 kWh. According 
to  the  Ministry  of  Energy  and  Natural  Resources  (MENR)  2004-2020 
projections that assume a continued cumulative annual growth rate of 7.7% 
in gross demand, per capita consumption is forecasted to reach 5,700 kWh 
by 2020.7
The  forces  that  fuel  growth  in  the  sector  are  continued  economic  and 
industrial  development,  population  growth  and  improving  income  levels. 
According  to  projections  prepared  by  the  national  transmission  company 
TEIAS on the growth of supply, there is sufficient generation capacity at least 
until year 2009. Required investments for more capacity are expected to be 
covered primarily by private sector investments (Lazard, 2007).
3. An Outline of Turkish Electricity Distribution Industry
3.1. Evolution of the Turkish electricity industry
6
This  section  of  the  paper  provides  a  brief overview  of  the  evolution  of 
electricity industry in Turkey with a view to reveal the dynamics that have 
shaped current reform process in electricity distribution sector.
The  Republic  of  Turkey  was  founded  in  1923,  and  until  the  1930s  the 
electricity  industry  was  heavily  dependent  on  foreign  investment  as  the 
country was trying a liberal economy. In the 1930s, there was a widespread 
belief all over the world in the benefits of public ownership of the electricity 
industry.  Following  this  trend,  nationalization  of  Turkish  electricity  industry 
started in 1938 and, by 1944, almost all electricity industry had been placed 
within the public domain.
In  the  1960s,  the  government  started  the  “development  plans  era”.  The 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) was established in 1963, 
and was responsible for Turkey’s energy policy. This was followed in 1970 by 8
the creation of Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK), which would have a 
monopoly  in  the  Turkish  electricity  sector  at  almost  all  stages  apart  from 
distribution, which were left to the local administrations
7.
In the early 1980s, as was the case in many European countries, the Turkish 
electricity  industry  was  dominated  by  a  state-owned  vertically  integrated 
company, TEK. Starting from the 1980s, the government sought to attract 
private participation into the industry in order to ease the investment burden 
on the general budget. In 1982, the monopoly of public sector on generation 
was abolished and the private sector was allowed to build power plants and 
sell their electricity to TEK. In 1984, TEK was restructured and gained the 
status of state-owned enterprise. 
Various private sector participation models short of privatization were put into 
practice.  The  first  law  setting  up  a  framework  for  private  participation  in 
electricity industry was enacted in 1984 (Law No. 3096). This Law forms the 
legal basis for private participation through Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
contracts for new generation facilities, Transfer of Operating Rights (TOOR) 
contracts  for  existing  generation  and  distribution  assets,  and  the 
autoproducer system for companies to produce their own electricity. Under a 
BOT concession, a private company would build and operate a plant for up to 
99 years (subsequently reduced to 49 years) and then transfer it to the state 
at  no  cost.  Under  a  TOOR,  the  private  enterprise  would  operate  (and 
rehabilitate where necessary) an existing government-owned facility through 
a lease-type arrangement (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003).9
In  1993,  TEK  was  incorporated  into  privatization  plan  and  split  into  two 
separate  state-owned  enterprises,  namely  Turkish  Electricity  Generation 
Transmission Co. (TEAS) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Co. (TEDAS). 
However, the constitutional court of Turkey issued a series of rulings in 1994 
and  1995  making  the  privatization  almost  impossible  to  implement  in 
electricity  industry.  Therefore,  in  August  1999,  the  parliament  passed  a 
constitutional amendment permitting the privatization of public utility services 
and allowing international arbitration for resolving disputes. However, during 
this  interval,  Turkey  not  only lost  five  invaluable  years  in  terms  of  reform 
process that could never get back but also, and more importantly, tried to 
enhance  the  attractiveness  of  BOT  projects  by  providing  “take  or  pay” 
guarantees by the Undersecretariat of Treasury for adding new generation 
capacity to meet anticipated demand. An additional  law, namely the Build 
Operate and Own
8 (BOO) Law (No. 4283), for private sector participation in 
the construction and operation of new power plants was also enacted in 1997 
again with guarantees provided by the Treasury
9.
3.2. Recent electricity market reforms
By  the  end  of  the  1990s,  it  became  clear  that  quasi-privatization  with 
Treasury  guarantees  was  not  going  to  be  feasible  given  the  rapidly 
deteriorating fiscal situation. Therefore, Turkey turned to a radically different 
framework for the design of her energy market.
On 3 March 2001, Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) came into force 
and  aimed  at  establishing  a  financially  strong,  stable,  transparent  and 10
competitive electricity market. In line with new law, TEAS was restructured to 
form  three  new  state-owned  public  enterprises,  namely  Turkish  Electricity 
Transmission  Co. (TEIAS), Electricity Generation Co. (EUAS) and Turkish 
Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. (TETAS). The new law also created 
an autonomous regulatory body, namely Energy Market Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA). 
Electricity Market Law
10 (EML) made former laws on private investment in the 
electricity sector obsolete. The main issues and building blocks of the new 
system are given below.
3.2.1. Market Opening and Market Design
As of January 2008, on the demand side, consumers that consume more 
than 1.2 GWh per annum are designated as “eligible consumers” that are 
free to choose their suppliers. The ultimate aim is stated as 100% market 
opening. On the supply side, the authorization-type licensing framework was 
established  in  the  new  regime,  which  provides  entry  opportunities  into 
generation, wholesale supply, distribution, retail supply, import and export of 
electricity. Transmission remains as a state monopoly.
At  the  heart  of  the  new  regime  is  a  bilateral  contracts  market  where 
generation companies contract with wholesale trade companies (TETAS and 
any  eventual  new  entrants),  distribution  companies,  any  new  independent 
retail supply companies, and eligible consumers. As for end-users, eligible 
consumers may not only buy electricity from their regional distribution/retail 11
supply company, but also may buy directly from a wholesale company, a new 
independent retail supply company or an independent generator. Captive (or 
non-eligible) consumers, on the other hand, must buy their electricity from the 
distribution/retail supply company in their region, but they also have the right 
to buy from any retail supply company operating in the region.
The EML requires the regulated third party access (rTPA) regime for access 
to the transmission and distribution system. The regulatory body (the EMRA) 
will carry out the function of dispute settlement between parties.
As for public service obligations, the EML only allows for an explicit cash 
subsidy in the form of direct cash refunds to consumers without affecting the 
price structure in cases where some consumers need to be supported based 
on non-economic objectives.
The current market design does not envisage a centralized pool or power 
exchange.  The  actual  real-time  equality of  demand  and  supply, given  the 
bilateral contracts, will be carried out by the system operator (that is, TEIAS) 
through  purchases  and  sales  in  a  balancing  market.  For  this  purpose,  a 
“System Balancing and Settlement Center” was established within TEIAS. In 
short, it is expected that the market would be mostly by bilateral contracts
and pool would be limited to balancing transactions only.12
3.2.2. Restructuring (or Unbundling)
As  discussed  above,  TEAS  has  been  further  unbundled  into  EUAS 
(generation),  TETAS  (wholesale  trading  and  contracting)  and  TEIAS 
(transmission), each organized as a separate legal entity.
Under the new structure, EUAS will take over existing public power plants 
that are not transferred to the private sector. TETAS is created to carry out 
wholesale operations and it seems that it will dominate wholesale market in 
the  near future.  TETAS is also  the  holder of  all  previous  BOO, BOT  and 
TOOR  contracts,  including  long-term  power  purchase  agreements  with 
Treasury  guaranties;  and  will  assume  other  stranded  costs.  TEIAS  is 
responsible for transmission and, critically, for the balancing and settlement 
procedure  that  will  balance  the  power  transactions  among  parties,  both 
physically  and  financially,  in  the  new  framework.  That  is,  TEIAS  is  the 
transmission system operator (TSO) in Turkey.
Turkey’s  electricity  distribution  network  was  divided  into  21  distribution 
regions. TEDAS, which owns 20 of the 21 regions, have been included in the 
privatization  programme,  and  a  separate  distribution  company  has  been 
established in each of these 20 regions. These distribution companies are 
currently owned by TEDAS.13
3.2.3. Privatization
The principal aims of EML have been to open the Turkish electricity market to 
competition  and  found  an  independent  regulatory  agency  to  regulate  the 
industry.  The  law does  not  particularly stress  privatization,  even  though  it 
outlines general principles of privatizations (Article 14
11). EML’s aim was to 
provide  a  way to  a  sustainable  privatization  by  establishing  a  competitive 
environment.
In  March  2004,  the  government  issued  the  Strategy  Paper  Concerning 
Electricity Market Reform and Privatization, which outlines the major steps to 
be  taken  during  the  period  up  to  2012  and  addresses  various  issues, 
including  the  privatization  of  distribution  assets and  power  plants. 
According  to  the  strategy  paper,  privatization  will  start  in  the  distribution 
sector  in  2005  and  will  be  completed  in  2006!  After  the  privatization  of 
distribution assets, generation privatization will start in mid-2006. Seventeen 
hydropower  plants  (which  total  7,055  MW  of  capacity
12),  the  transmission 
system  and  market  operator,  TEIAS,  will  remain  in  state  ownership  (IEA, 
2005, p 144).
3.3. Legal environment regarding privatization of distribution regions
13
In  Turkish  administrative  law,  the  Constitutional  Court  and  the  Danistay 
(Council of State) recognize all segments of the electricity industry as public 
services, requiring close supervision by public authorities. Turkish public law 
deems contracts for the provision of public services by private parties to be 14
administrative  contracts.  Accordingly,  such  contracts  are  subject  to  public 
law.
Turkish Parliament passed a constitutional revision on August 13, 1999 to 
open the door to privatization in the electricity industry. To begin with, the 
amendment gave Parliament the authority to allow for the provision of public 
services  through  private  law  contracts.  The  amendment  also  allowed 
international arbitration in concession contracts, which was denied previously 
by the Constitutional Court and the Danistay.
Turkish Constitutional Court describes privatization as the transfer of public 
rights, monetary and non-monetary assets to domestic and foreign private 
entrepreneurs. In recent decisions, the court argued that ‘unlimited’ foreign 
ownership in strategic industries such as telecommunications and electricity 
would weaken national security and run contrary to the notion of sovereignty. 
Restrictions  on  foreign  ownership  were  thus  seen  as  a  constitutional 
requirement.  The  decision  provides  a  major  rule  for  privatization.  Since 
unlimited  foreign  ownership  of  energy  and  telecommunications  industries 
undermines national sovereignty, any acceptable privatization should include 
reasonable checks and limits against foreign ownership
14.
Turkish  Constitutional  Court  makes  a  distinction  between  privatizations  in 
generation  and  that  of  electricity  distribution.  The  Court  accepts  that 
operating  rights  for  generation  facilities  can  be  transferred  to  private 
enterprises for a limited time. However, natural resources cannot be privately 
owned. Constitutional Court does not deny the ability to transfer ownership 15
rights (TOR)  of  a  public company  to  private  entrepreneurs  in  the  case  of 
electricity generation. In the text of the decision, the Court does not separate 
the ownership of the natural resource and any plant that uses the resource. 
In the case of distribution facilities, the Court permits TOR model. However, it 
does not mention the transfer of ownership rights of a distribution facility to 
private entrepreneurs. The Danistay has the same opinion on this issue. It 
seems that there is no constitutional restriction here. 
The  Constitutional  Court  and  the  Danistay  take  the  public  interest  as  the 
decisive criterion in their investigations on privatization cases; however, they 
cite the vague concept of public interest without giving a clear definition of 
what  is  in  the  public’s  interest.  The  reluctance  to  define  public  interest 
explicitly  and  precisely  leaves  plenty  of  room  for  political  and  legal 
maneuvering. Actually, this is one of the reasons why we do not find any 
clear description of public interest. The controversial nature of the notion of 
‘public  interest’  and  varying  interpretations  of  the  concept  by  the  political 
authority and judiciary has led to the annulment by the Constitutional Court 
and  the  Danistay  of  many privatization  attempts  in  recent  years.  The 
resultant  uncertainty  about  the  outcome  of  privatizations,  naturally,  has 
increased  the  cost  of  privatization  and  served  to  discourage  potential 
investors.
To  come  to  the  point,  today,  there  are  two  regulations on  electricity 
distribution privatizations. The older of the two provides the framework for the 
transfer of operation rights, enacted in 1984 (Law 3096, known as the ‘‘BOT 
Law’’). The Cabinet has the authority to decide on privatization and MENR 16
oversees the process. No transfer of ownership can be made through this 
process.  The  newer  regulation  is  Article  14  of  EML.  However, this  article 
does not provide the rules and methods of privatizations and refers to the 
general law on privatizations (Law 4046), mentioning only that MENR should 
provide  proposals  and/or  opinions  for  a  prospective  electricity  services 
privatization and also that foreigners cannot have controlling market power. 
Law 4046 provides the rules and regulations for any privatization in Turkey. 
The  Privatization  Administration  (PA),  established  under  this  law  as  an 
administrative agency, implements and regulates privatizations. It undertakes 
the management of companies in the process of privatization. The law also 
describes methods of privatization, gives authority to the PA to determine the 
value  of  the  company,  and  the  authority  to  oversee  the  process  of 
privatization.
3.4. TEDAS privatization overview
15
Turkish  Privatization  Administration  (PA)  has  started  the  privatization  of 
Turkey’s electricity distribution utility, TEDAS. PA has decided  to start the 
privatization process with the simultaneous tender of three companies, each 
operating in respective regions, namely Ankara (BEDAS), Anatolian part of 
Istanbul (AYEDAS) and Sakarya (SEDAS).
3.4.1. The model
Privatization of distribution companies will be executed using a Transfer of 
Operating Rights (TOR) backed Share Sale model (TSS model). According 17
to  this  model,  the  investor  will  be  the  sole  owner  of  the  shares  of  the 
distribution company which will be the unique licensee for the distribution of 
electricity in the designated region but which will not have the ownership of 
distribution  network  assets  and  other  items  that  are  essential  for  the 
operation of distribution assets. The ownership of these distribution assets 
will remain with TEDAS. The investor, through its shares in the distribution 
company, however, will be granted the right to operate the distribution assets 
pursuant to a Transfer of Operating Rights Agreement (TOR Agreement) with 
TEDAS.
Under  the  envisaged  market  structure,  privatized  electricity  distribution 
companies  will  operate  as  regional  monopolies  with  distribution  licenses 
granted  by  EMRA.  As  part  of  ongoing  liberalization  efforts  in  the  energy 
sector, Turkey’s distribution network was divided into 21 distribution regions 
based on geographical proximity, managerial structure, energy demand and 
other  technical/financial  factors.  After  the  inclusion  of  TEDAS  in  the 
privatization programme, a separate distribution company was established by 
the PA in each one of the 20 distribution regions owned by TEDAS. The only 
distribution region operated by a partially private company is Kayseri.
The  aim  of  the  TSS  model  is  to  handover  a  fully  operating  distribution 
company  to  the  investor.  Establishment  of  the  distribution  company  as  a 
separate legal entity, signing of the TOR Agreement, provision of distribution 
and retail sales licenses and signing of the Energy Sales Agreements have 
been  defined  as  the  necessary  pre-requisites  for  the  TSS  model 18
implementation. All of these steps have already been completed prior to the 
privatization tender announcement.
In the TSS model, the ownership of the existing assets and the new assets 
arising from investments to be carried out by the investor rests with TEDAS. 
The  investor  shall  purchase  the  shares  of  a  company  which  holds  the 
operating rights of distribution assets and all related assets (e.g., buildings, 
vehicles, machine park), and the electricity distribution and retail licenses in a 
given region. All investments shall be realized by the investor and will be 
recovered through the tariffs. Except for cases of investor misconduct, the 
part of investments not yet recovered via the tariffs shall be paid by TEDAS 
to the investor upon the expiry or termination of the contract.
3.4.2. Tariffs
The main purpose of the market liberalization is to achieve lower tariffs by 
increasing overall system efficiency. Accordingly, the tariffs are calculated as 
“cost-reflective”  based  on  predetermined  operating  and  loss/theft 
improvement targets.
The first tariff implementation period (or transition period), set as five years 
from 2006 to 2010, will serve as the transitory period to a fully cost based 
tariff structure after 2010. EMRA has already approved the end user tariffs 
and  revenue  requirements  of  each  distribution  company  for  the  transition 
period.  Revenue  requirements  cover  the  projected  expenses  for  providing 
distribution and retail services and provide an allowance for the target level of 19
technical and non-technical losses. The end-user tariffs for the period after 
2010 will be determined by the distribution companies in accordance with the 
Electricity Market Tariffs Communiqué and the related regulations and will be 
subject to EMRA’s approval.
The first implementation period is designed to have a smooth and gradual 
transition from existing tariff structure to a lean and simple tariff structure. As 
of 2010, most customer groups will have cost based tariffs in place and the 
tariff  groups  will  be  simplified  to  five  only,  namely  residential,  industrial, 
commercial, agricultural irrigation and lightening.
According  to  the  Electricity  Market  Law,  the  Electricity  Market  Tariffs 
Communiqué  and  other  related  regulation,  the  four  tariff  components;  (a) 
retail  sales,  (b)  distribution,  (c)  retail  services  and  (d)  transmission;  are 
governed in an unbundled fashion. Retail sales tariff has a “price cap” which 
is  set  as  the  basket  price  of  the  energy  purchased  by  the  distribution 
company. Distribution and retail services have “revenue caps” which cover 
operating expenses and investment requirements related to distribution and 
retail services. Transmission tariff is a complete pass-through of transmission 
costs as charged by the national transmission company.
The  existing  “national  tariff”  scheme  will  be  maintained  for  the  first  tariff 
implementation  period,  rather  than  implementing  “regional  tariffs”  so  that 
sudden price fluctuations could be avoided (currently, regional cost based 
tariffs vary significantly due to wide variation of loss/theft levels and other 
parameters across the regions). Implementation of national tariffs, however, 20
will result in revenue imbalances since the distribution company revenues will 
differ  from  their  envisaged  revenue  caps.  In  order  to  remove  such 
imbalances, EMRA will put in place a tariff equalization scheme to transfer 
revenues across the regions.
While the overall tariffs are pre-determined and approved for 2006-2010, the 
tariff  revision  process  has  still  not  been  finalized.  The  exact nature  and 
details of the process are expected to be announced by the EMRA soon.
3.4.3. Investments
One  of  the  primary  objectives  of  privatization  is  to  finance  required 
distribution  system  and  network  improvements  and  expansions  through 
private sector investments, thereby removing the burden of such investments 
away from the state budget. Investments are of great importance in ensuring 
continuity and quality of service in electricity distribution.
The annual expansion, replacement and improvement investments that are 
required  in  each  of  the  20  distribution  regions  during  the  first  tariff 
implementation  period  (2006–2010)  have  been  determined  during  the 
preparation of the end-user tariffs. For TEDAS as a whole, the investment 
requirement for the transition period is a total of YTL 2.8 billion ($2.3 billion), 
distributed equally to each year of the transition period. These investments 
have been embedded into the first implementation period tariffs approved by 
EMRA; hence, they will be recouped by the distribution companies over time. 21
Investment  requirements could be updated by EMRA through  the revision 
mechanisms.
After 2010, distribution companies will prepare annual investment plans each 
year  by  making  projections  on  consumption  growth,  analyzing  network
expansion  requirements  and  other  technical  parameters.  They  will  then 
present these investment plans to EMRA for approval. After receiving EMRA 
approval,  distribution  companies  are  obliged  to  implement  the  approved 
plans.  Implementation  of  these  investments  (i.e.  investment  amount  and 
form) will be monitored through investment control and quality measurement 
mechanisms  set  up  by  EMRA  in  collaboration  with  the  distribution 
companies.
EMRA approved tariffs do incorporate an allowed level of regulated return on 
the investments and services to be carried out as part of the electricity sales 
&  distribution  activities.  In  addition  to  this  allowed  level  of  return,  the 
distribution  company  can  create  substantial  value  by  beating  the  pre-
approved loss/theft and operational efficiency targets.
3.4.4. The progress so far
On January 9, 2007, the Turkish government announced the postponement 
of  the  privatization  of  parts  of  the  country's  electricity  distribution  network 
amid fears  that  it would  lead to higher  prices for  consumers  in a  general 
election year. During a trip abroad, the prime minister unsettled some of his 
cabinet colleagues and the financial markets by suggesting that the sell-off 22
might  be  too  politically  sensitive  as  Turkey  nears  polls,  scheduled  for 
November 2007.
On  July  1,  2008,  the  Turkish  Privatization  Administration  put  out  two 
distribution  regions  to  tender.  Turkey's  Sabanci  Holding  (Enerjisa)  and 
Austrian power giant Verbund submitted the highest bid in the first tender for 
Baskent Electricity Distribution Corporation (BEDAS) with an offer of $1.225 
billion. In the second separate tender, Akcez consortium offered highest bid 
for Sakarya Electricity Distribution Corporation (SEDAS) with $600 million. 
The consortium of Verbund and Sabanci would pay $1.225 billion for 100 
percent stakes of Baskent, which supplies 10 terawatt hours of electricity to 
2.9  million  customers in  and  around  the Turkish  capital  of  Ankara. In  the 
second tender, Akcez consortium offered the highest bid for the bargaining 
for the block sale of Sakarya Electricity Distribution Corporation with $600 
million. The Ankara and Sakarya grids together have 4.2 million customers 
who consume a combined 18 million gigawatt-hours of electricity.
Turkey's first auction of power grids attracted just two foreign utilities firms, 
compared  with  at  least  eight  that  planned  to  participate  in  2006,  as  the 
increased  political  uncertainty  in  Turkey  added  to  the  deteriorating  global 
financial conditions.
Recently, the government also raised the price of electricity for residential 
use by 22 percent, and the price of electricity for industrial use by 21 recently. 
The price hikes, part of an overhaul of Turkey's electricity pricing mechanism, 23
is seen as an important step for the privatizations of electricity distribution 
and production assets.
Next up  for  sale  are power grids  covering  the  central  Anatolian  region  of 
Meram, and Aras in the east.
4. Why should the distribution be privatized?
The  growing  empirical  evidence  on  the  inefficiency  of  state-owned 
enterprises  and  a  worldwide  trend  toward  liberalization  are  the  main 
motivations  of  privatization  in  many  developing  countries.  Turkish  public 
enterprises in general and Turkish public electricity distribution companies in 
particular have not been the exceptions.
The balance between state and market experienced a radical shift with the 
fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. Since then, the boundaries of the state have 
started to shift; and the privatizations in Britain and the transition from state 
socialism to the market economy in Eastern Europe accelerated this shift. 
Within less then a decade, privatization spread around the world. Today, the 
English  model  of  vertical  separation  succeeded  by  privatization  and 
regulation  is  rapidly  becoming  the  reference  model  for  reform  in  both 
developed and developing countries. 
Electricity is a product that is generally regarded as nonstorable
16. Also, the 
demand for  electricity fluctuates  by time  of day and  year, as  the weather 
varies,  and  randomly.  Supply  is  also  subject  to  unpredictable  outages. 24
However,  the  equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand,  called  “electrical 
equilibrium”, must  be maintained  continuously and  throughout  the system, 
which  calls  for  extremely  close  minute-by-minute  coordination  between 
generation and transmission & distribution. 
In  view  of  technical  characteristics  of  the  industry,  a  policy  of  vertically 
integrated  monopoly  has  some  attractions.  The  integrated 
generation/transmission/distribution  company  can  easily  run  its  power 
stations that meet demand at minimum cost at each point in time. Moreover, 
in the longer run, investment can be planned to give the optimal mix and 
capacity  to  meet  prospective  demand  with  reasonable  security  of  supply. 
This is, actually, the main reason why these activities have historically been 
vertically integrated. Nevertheless, since they allow no room for competition 
and its associated incentives, such schemes nowadays have started to be 
replaced  by  vertically  separated  private  utilities  with  the  aim  of  fostering 
competition.
In economic theory, the reasons for privatization are manifold. The ultimate 
and most important aim of privatization is ensuring “economic efficiency”; and 
it can be realized in full sense only by effective competition, which requires 
reducing the role of government in economic life as a whole. The case for 
private  ownership  rests  essentially  on  the  importance  of  incentives  to 
innovate and to reduce costs. The weak incentive of government employees 
concerning  both  cost  reduction  and  innovation  is the  basic  reason  of 
superiority of private ownership. In a state-owned company, prices do not 
reflect  costs;  and costs themselves are  usually inflated  through excessive 25
employment  and  excessively expensive  capital;  incentives  to  innovate are 
reduced to minimum (or in worst cases to zero); quality of service is lower 
than in a competitive environment; and the number of choices available to 
consumers  is  extremely  limited  (or  even  reduced  to  one!).  What  is  more 
striking and dangerous is that until the point when it is seen to be in crisis 
from outside, a public enterprise never feels a failure no matter what is the 
degree of its failure in realizing economic efficiency.
The other reasons for privatization cited in the literature may be summarized 
as follows. Privatization provides competition with a fertile ground to develop. 
Also,  it  is  argued  that  the  valuation  of  the  company  by  movements  in  its 
share  price  in  stock  exchanges  is  potentially  an  important  check  on  a 
privatized  enterprise’s  performance.  Moreover,  the  possibility  of  a  hostile 
takeover  in  a  competitive  market  imposes  a  fierce  discipline  on  the 
management  and  provides  a  powerful  incentive  to  good  management 
because  a  takeover  usually  leads  to  many  changes  near  the  top. 
Furthermore,  some  scholars  claim  that  the  most  important  effect  of 
privatization  is  that  the  changes  it  brings  about  become  practically 
irreversible.  In  the  case  of  reforming  public  enterprises,  the  possibility  is 
much  greater  that  a  change  of  government  or  even  just  a  change  in  the 
opinion of the same government will undermine all reforms and may result in 
a return to the old interventionism and confusion. Privatization, on the other 
hand is less reversible not only because the legislation needed to reverse it 
would be more complex, and because in some cases the privatized bodies 
have disappeared into other firms or acquired overseas ownership, but also 26
because  too  many  interests  have  been  created  that  are  opposed  to 
renationalization (Erdogdu, 2005).
In  Turkish  case,  the  officially  declared  reasons  for  the  privatization  of 
electricity distribution regions are as follows (OIB, 2008): 
o Efficiency improvement and cost reduction 
o Ensuring security of electricity supply and improvement in quality of 
electricity supplied
o Reduction in distribution loss/theft levels
o Getting  private  sector  made  necessary  investments  in  electricity 
distribution business
o Exploiting the benefits of competition and directing those benefits to 
consumers
5. Guidelines for Policy Makers
Having discussed both the background and current status of developments in 
Turkish  electricity  distribution  segment  let  me  comment  on  them.  On  the 
positive  side  and  from  the  investors’  point  of  view,  the  benefits  and 
opportunities of the envisaged system can been summarized as follows. First 
of  all,  the  investor  is  allowed  to  retain  excess  value  derived  from 
outperforming  the  predetermined  loss/theft  targets  approved  by  EMRA. 
Accordingly, as  a  result  of  this  policy, technical  and  non-technical losses, 
which have become an excessive financial burden in Turkey over the years, 
are  expected  to  be  reduced  to  single  digit  figures.  Also,  the  investor  is 27
allowed  to  retain  the  savings  achieved  if  energy  is  sourced  at  a  lower 
wholesale cost than the regulated reference price. This policy will pave the 
way for construction of low-cost electricity production facilities going forward. 
Furthermore,  the  investor  is  allowed  to  retain  excess  value  derived  from 
outperforming the predetermined operational improvement targets approved 
by EMRA. This will trigger efficiency improvements in electricity distribution. 
At  each  distribution  company,  substantial  operational  efficiency 
improvements  are  believed  to  be  achievable  through  optimizing  core 
business  processes  such  as  billing  and  collections,  arranging  and
redesigning  work  flows,  enabling  effective  coordination  between  divisions, 
improving information systems and infrastructure and optimizing personnel 
productivity (Lazard, 2007).
Within this  context,  the  efficiency  improvements  in  distribution  segment  is 
especially crucial since distribution cost together with generation cost make 
up more than 75% of electricity bill of a household in Turkey, which means 
that  any  efficiency  increase  in  distribution  industry  may  be  redirected  to 
reductions in  electricity  bills.  Table  4  provides  the  distribution  of  costs  in 
electricity bill of a household in Turkey.
[ Table 4 goes here ]
On  the  negative  side,  there  exist  some  crucial  problems  that  must  be 
addressed to establish a healthy system of electricity distribution. First of all, 
as indicated, the main components of electricity price can be divided into the 
wholesale price, the price of network operations (transmission & distribution) 28
and  taxes.  Since  wholesale  price,  tax  related  issues  and  the  price  of 
transmission network operations are outside the scope of the present paper, 
let me concentrate on the price of distribution network operations. We know 
that even tax level, wholesale price and the price of transmission network 
operations  are  determined  efficiently,  total  welfare  can  be  significantly 
disturbed  if  distribution  network  operations  are  priced  inefficiently.  In 
literature,  it  is  argued  that  if  a  sector  presents  natural  monopoly 
characteristics (i.e., real competition is not possible), the only two reasonable 
ways to  determine  the  price  of  distribution  network  operations  are
benchmarking and frequent tenders. However, in Turkey, the current model 
seems to be based on a kind of rate of return regulation, in which costs are 
determined  by the  regulated firm  and  the regulator  approves them before 
their reflection into tariffs. Since, the regulator cannot determine the optimal 
level of costs due to the problem of asymmetric information; such a system is 
far from ensuring economic efficiency. Therefore, a kind of benchmarking or 
frequent  tenders  should  be  incorporated  in  tariff  determination  process  in 
Turkey
17.
Second, the current situation of continued state-ownership of the distribution 
companies limits the supervisory role of EMRA over the market. The lack of 
necessary  incentive  mechanisms  for  managers  and  bureaucrats  in  the 
distribution  companies  makes  regulatory  enforcement  more  difficult  and 
leaves room for political pressure in the industry. Therefore, the privatization 
of  distribution  companies  must  be  completed  as  soon  as  possible  in  an 
appropriate  way.  The  opposition  to  privatization  of  some  bureaucrats  will 29
definitely be formidable. To counter this, a chairman who is more favorable to 
privatization may be appointed to the enterprises to be privatized
18.
Third,  it  seems  that  current  model  of  privatization  (TOR)  is  preferred  in 
electricity distribution to prevent a situation of double payment by end-users. 
Since infrastructure costs have already been recouped by the state—more 
precisely, by taxpayers—prior to privatization, if the distribution assets are 
sold,  then  the  purchasing  company  would  reflect  such  asset  costs  to  the 
tariffs and customers will be made to pay twice for the same cost. Although it 
is  a  reasonable  approach,  the  use  of  the  TOR  model  as  the  method  of 
privatization  creates  its  own  problems.  For  instance,  it  seems  that  in  the 
tenders  for  distribution  regions  the  competing  firms  will  bid  based  on  the 
shares of the distribution company which will be the unique licensee for the 
distribution of electricity in the designated region. However, such a method is 
far from realizing irreversibility of the privatization process as it is very easy to 
return  back  to  previous  structure  since  ownership  of  the  assets  are  not 
transferred  to  private parties. Actually, from  an  economic  point  of  view, a 
method based on the transfer of asset ownership to private parties and a 
tender  based  on  “unit  service  and  depreciation  charge”  are  much  more 
preferable to current practices.
The fourth concern is related with ambiguity of the process following tenders. 
That  is,  how  long  will  a  firm  be  a  unique  licensee  for  the  distribution  of 
electricity  in  the  designated  region?  If  an  incumbent  distribution  company 
prefers to put an end to its activities, what will happen? Will there be another 
tender?  If  yes,  will  new  firm  pay  to  previous  firm  for  the  shares?  In  the 30
literature, it is stated that repeating tenders on a specific basis is urgent if 
benchmarking is not employed in the tariff determination process because it 
remains  the  only way  to  reflect  the  cost reductions to  consumers.  If  both 
benchmarking and frequent tenders are not employed, then the incumbent 
firm gets all benefits of cost reduction without reflecting them to tariffs. In 
Turkey,  both  of  these  methods  are  not  planned  to  be  employed  so  there 
exists a threat of excessive profits in the sector.
Other three  concerns  relate  to  “expertise”,  “effective  regulation”  and 
“institutionalization”. To begin with, all persons or bodies that do not have 
sufficient expertise in issues related with energy markets but whose ideas or 
decisions have still a vital effect on the energy market should consult those 
with expertise before revealing their ideas or making some decisions with an 
(sometimes, profound) effect on the energy market. The decisions of courts 
are especially critical in this respect. Also, effective regulation by EMRA is 
extremely imperative to set up a fully functioning market. Therefore, EMRA 
needs to be prepared for such a regulatory function by equipping itself with 
necessary  tools,  such  as  highly  qualified  staff,  necessary  technological 
infrastructure and so on. The last issue is the institutionalization of the whole 
process  of  market  reform,  including  privatization,  tariff  setting  etc.  As  we 
know that the expressed intent toward privatization and liberalization do not 
always  mesh  with  political  preferences.  While  politicians  have  long-term 
desires to privatize state owned enterprises (like, TEDAS), their short-term 
goals and bureaucratic stronghold cause them to remain tied to the reigns of 
economic  power  and  potential  rent  sources.  Without  institutionalization, 
Turkish electricity distribution sector will not be able to get rid of the dump of 31
unimplemented plans and timetables, such as the Strategy Paper of March 
2004; will continue to be directed by sudden and unexpected unilateral acts 
of politicians, as in the case of previous postponement of tenders by prime 
minister in January 2007; and rent seeking activities in overextended public 
institutions will continue to harm by encouraging economic inefficiencies, thus 
causing welfare losses and wealth transfers due to higher electricity prices.
Finally, at first sight, auction model appears to provide a very attractive way 
of  combining  competition and  efficiency without  any  heavy burden for  the 
regulator.  The  competition  for  market  appears  to  destroy  the  undesirable 
monopoly of information that hinders conventional regulation, and price is set 
by  competition,  not  by  bureaucrats.  Provided  bidding  is  competitive,  an
auction will reduce the profits to the normal competitive level by inducing bid 
prices equal to unit costs of production. 
Nevertheless, auction model is not without some difficulties. First of all, as 
mentioned above, bidding must be competitive and cases of collusive bidding 
need to be prevented. There exist mainly two reasons why bidding might fail 
to be competitive. First of all, there is a danger of collusion between bidders, 
especially  if  they  are  few  in  number
19,  or  if  the  firms  are  effectively  in  a 
repeated interaction (or, “game”) with one another via frequent contracts. The 
second reason is that one firm might enjoy such strategic advantages in the 
competition for the franchise that other firms would be unwilling to compete 
with  it.  For  instance,  suppose  that  an  incumbent  firm  is  the  holder  of  a 
franchise that is now up for renewal. Since, thanks to its past operation of the 
franchise, the incumbent has already reduced its costs; other firms will be 32
unwilling to compete with the incumbent as they know that they are unlikely 
to win the competition. Also, another source of incumbent advantage may 
originate  from  asymmetries  of  information.  The  incumbent’s  knowledge  of 
cost and demand conditions is likely superior to that of any other firm, which 
tends to deter others from competing with it in the future auction. 
The merits of auction model are further reduced by the issues related with 
asset handover. Unless sunk costs are zero (an extremely unlikely event), 
efficiency  requires  that  the  new  operator  of  the  franchise  takes  over  the 
assets from the incumbent
20. Therefore, one needs to decide how the assets 
to be valued for this purpose. In such a case, there is a problem of bilateral 
monopoly. If incumbent has no alternative, it has to accept as little as the 
scrap value of the assets. If the new operator firm has no alternative, it has to 
pay  as  much  as  their  replacement  value.  The  gap  between  replacement 
value and scrap value is likely to be large if the assets involve sunk costs. 
The  last  difficulty  with  auction  model  is  the  question  of  specification, 
administration and monitoring of franchise contract. The duration of franchise 
contract  must  also  be  considered.  The  difficulties  of  contract  specification 
and  administration  perhaps  suggest  that  short-term  contracts  have 
advantages,  because  fewer  future  unforeseeable  events  then  need  to  be 
considered.  Nevertheless,  the  organization  of  frequent  contests  for  the 
franchise also involves major costs: all the problems of asset valuation and 
handover occur more often, and the industry would frequently be in a state of 
turmoil.33
6. Conclusion
Although Turkish electricity reform is not concluded yet, we can assess its 
performance  to  date  in  achieving  its  primary  goals.  The  reform  is  quite 
complex and addresses different objectives. The main one is to change the 
government to policy-maker and regulator, transferring the responsibility of 
operations and investment to the private sector. This change was imposed by 
its  unwillingness  and  incapacity  to  finance  system  expansion  and  by  the 
urgent necessity of attracting private investment, which is crucial to avoid an 
electricity supply collapse. That is, the privatization of the Turkish electricity 
distribution  sector  is  not  a  social  option;  it  is  mandated  by  economic 
constraints, since the government does not have the capacity to invest and 
guarantee electricity supply to support economic growth.
In this paper, we have tried to present current situation of Turkish electricity 
distribution privatizations and summarize some problems that surround them. 
The  paper  is  for  the  most  part  limited  to  the  economic  dimension  of  the 
problems and their practical implications. The privatization experience in the 
Turkish  electricity  distribution  segment  is  of  considerable  interest  for 
observing how globalization via international investment in the privatization of 
an  emerging  country’s  strategic  sector  deals  with  local  patriotic  reactions 
arising  from  various  national  entities,  including  the  national  judiciary  and 
bureaucratic establishment (Ulusoy et al., 2007).
Despite relatively good legislative framework, the current Turkish policy on 
privatization of distribution regions in practice seems to be far from ideal. The 34
whole privatization process appears to aim providing additional revenues to 
treasury without paying attention to the crucial underlying economic logic. It 
should not be forgotten that every new structure entails new understanding of 
the issues. If privatization process progresses based on underlying economic 
logic,  there  is  no  reason not  to  believe  that  the  domestic  and  foreign 
investors will be greatly interested in entering a market with excellent growth 
potential, like Turkish electricity distribution business. Also, one should not 
blame the bureaucrats in the Turkish energy industry, its unions, and others 
for  trying  to  protect  what  they  see  as  their  interests  by  persuading  the 
government to retain previous structure as much as possible. But it will have 
a devastating effect for the country if they are successful in doing so as the
way  would  be  open  for  continued  manipulation  of  state  owned  electricity 
distribution companies.
In  a  few  words,  Turkey  is  at  a  crossroads  and  she needs  to  answer the 
question of whether the operation and management of electricity distribution 
networks in this country will evolve into a market-driven commodity business 
or remain a genuine public utility task. As only a limited number of actions
has been taken in the privatization process so far, a significant amount of 
work still lies ahead to answer that question.35
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Footnotes
                                                
1 In  October  2005,  accession negotiations  are  opened  with  Turkey,  who  has  been  an 
associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. For a more 
detailed discussion of EU-Turkey relations, see Erdogdu (2002).
2 For a more in depth discussion of nuclear energy in Turkey, see Erdogdu (2007c).
3 The industrials customer group represents approximately 50% of the total demand, while 
residential  customers  consume  slightly  less  than  a  quarter  of  the  total.  Commercials 
customer group, excluding public institutions, is placed third in terms of consumption with a 
13% share.
4 Turkey imports 96.9% of her natural gas consumption.
5 The author himself is working for the EMRA.
6 Unless otherwise stated, this part is mainly based on the information included in Erdogdu 
(2005).
7 In 1982, however, distribution was also transferred to TEK, thus making TEK a national 
vertically integrated monopoly fully owned by the state.
8 Under the BOO model, investors retain ownership of the facility at the end of the contract 
period. That is, it is a kind of licensing system rather than a concession award.
9 A typical BOT, BOO or TOOR generation contract, signed between the private party and 
TEAS  or  TEDAS,  includes  exclusive  “take  or  pay”  obligations  with  fixed  quantities  (in 
general, 85% of the plant output) and prices (or price formulas) over 15-30 years. That is, 
under  these  models,  the  government  retains  most  commercial  risks  while  providing  the 
private sector with substantial rewards. Also the situation was worse in Turkey as, in Turkish 
case; there was no requirement for prequalification or even for a competitive open tender to 
conclude these contracts (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003), which resulted in onerous terms and high 
electricity prices.
10 EML is, for the most part, compatible with the EU Electricity Directive of 2003.
11 Article  14  of  this  law  is  as  follows:  'The  Ministry  shall  provide  the  Privatization 
Administration  with  proposals  and  opinions  regarding  the  privatization  of  the  assets 
belonging to TEDAS and EUAS, their subsidiaries, affiliates, partnerships and operational 
units  and  facilities.  The  privatization  process  shall  be  executed  by  the  Privatization 
Administration according to the provisions of Privatization Law no: 4046. The foreign real 42
                                                                                                                                         
persons and legal entities engaged in the market activities as defined by this Law within the 
scope of  privatization activities cannot  have  a market share that  will enable  them with a 
control power in the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors.'
12 This figure equals to 19.5 % of total installed capacity in Turkey.
13 Unless otherwise stated, this part is mainly based on the information included in Ulusoy et 
al. (2007).
14 This concern of Turkish Constitutional Court is ‘partly’ alleviated by Article 14 of the EML. 
According to this article, foreign real persons and legal entities cannot have a market share 
that  will  give  them  controlling  power  in  the  electricity  generation,  transmission  and 
distribution sectors.
15 Unless otherwise stated, this part is mainly based on the information included in Lazard 
(2007).
16 Armstrong et al. (1994, p 280) reports that there is a sense in which some hydroelectric 
power can be stored. In the UK, the National Grid Company has a pumped storage business 
in the Welsh mountains. Water pumped uphill at night can produce hydroelectric power the 
following  day,  thereby  effectively  storing  some  night-time  electricity.  This  is  economically 
efficient, provided that the day/night electricity price ratio is high enough.
17 For a more in depth discussion of  the subject in general  and “problem of  asymmetric 
information” in particular, see Erdogdu (2007b).
18 Another important problem is the unions’ reaction to privatizations. There is much at stake 
and unions are expected to take all legal and political measures to stop privatizations until 
their demands are satisfied. In fact, they have challenged privatizations in court in almost all 
recent  privatizations.  In  many  cases,  privatizations  were  cancelled  based  on  legal 
technicalities. Unions also lobby the government in order to get better pecuniary gains for 
their displaced members.
19 Since, in electricity distribution industry, the requisite skills and/or resources are rare; it is 
generally the case.
20 Otherwise there will be inefficient duplication of assets.Table 1. Selected indicators for Turkey (2004)
Indicator Value
Population (million) 71,158,647 (July 2007 est.)
Population growth rate 1.04% (2007 est.)
GDP (purchasing power parity) $640.4 billion (2006 est.)
GDP (official exchange rate) $361.1 billion (2006 est.)
GDP real growth rate 6.1% (2006 est.)
GDP per capita (PPP) $9,100 (2006 est.)
Electricity production 154.2 billion kWh (2005)
Electricity consumption 129 billion kWh (2005)




a (Mt of CO2) 209.45
a CO2 Emissions from fuel combustion only. Emissions are calculated 
using IEA's energy balances and the Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines.Table 2. Energy balances for Turkey (2004)











Production 10531 2224 0 566 0 3963 1271 5557 0 0 24111
Imports 11200 23748 10481 18117 0 0 0 0 40 0 63587
Exports 0 0 -5289 0 0 0 0 0 -98 0 -5387
International Marine Bunkers
b 0 0 -1005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1005
Stock Changes 648 -183 115 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 599
TPES 22379 25789 4302 18704 0 3963 1271 5557 -59 0 81905
Transfers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Statistical Differences -64 191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 126
Electricity Plants -8701 0 -764 -7964 0 -3963 -85 -21 12436 0 -9063
CHP Plants -75 0 -1131 -3028 0 0 0 -5 524 450 -3265
Heat Plants -532 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -532
Gas Works 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum Refineries 0 -26065 26534 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 469
Coal Transformation -1910 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1910
Liquefaction Plants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other Transformation 0 85 -85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Own Use -302 0 -1706 -100 0 0 0 0 -615 0 -2724
Distribution Losses -27 0 0 -19 0 0 0 0 -1999 0 -2045TFC 10766 0 27150 7594 0 0 1186 5530 10287 450 62962
Industry sector 8361 0 4460 2178 0 0 121 0 4992 0 20112
Transport sector 0 0 13079 105 0 0 0 0 63 0 13246
Other sectors 2405 0 5858 4881 0 0 1065 5530 5233 450 25420
Residential 2405 0 2879 3640 0 0 1065 5530 2375 0 17894
Commercial and Public Services 0 0 0 1240 0 0 0 0 2522 0 3763
Agriculture / Forestry 0 0 2979 0 0 0 0 0 318 0 3297
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 0 17
Non-Specified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 450 450
Non-Energy Use 0 0 3754 430 0 0 0 0 0 0 4184
- of which 0 0 1406 430 0 0 0 0 0 0 1836
Petrochemical Feedstocks
(in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) on a net calorific value basis)
aTotals may not add up due to rounding.








Natural Gas 14,199 36.58 72,700 44.74
Hydropower 12,906 33.25 40,800 25.11
Coal 9,117 23.49 40,700 25.05
Oil 2,527 6.51 8,000 4.92
Biomass 28 0.07 150 0.09
Geothermal 23 0.06 90 0.06
Wind 20 0.05 60 0.04
Total 38,820 100 162,500 100Table 4. The distribution of costs in electricity bill of a household in Turkey (2008)
YTL/kWh %
Generation (a) 0,121069 64,07
Transmission (b) 0,004152 2,20
Distribution (c) 0,021417 11,33
Retail Sale (d) 0,001639 0,87
Total (A=a+b+c+d) 0,148277 78,47
Energy Fund (%1) (e) 0,001483 0,78
TRT Share (%2) (f) 0,002966 1,57
Municipality Consumption Tax (%5) (g) 0,007414 3,92
Total (B=e+f+g) 0,011862 6,28
VAT (%18) (C=[A+B]*0,18) 0,028825 15,25
TOTAL (A+B+C) 0,188964 100,00